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An attempt is made to explore the basic implications of differences in productivity growth rates in 
countries within a monetary union and tailor them to the case of the EU new member countries 
running up to the EMU. By using the mathematical model of Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect and 
linking productivity and relative price dynamics with monetary policy, it is shown that: 1) productivity 
growth in faster-growing countries (FGC) leads to either inflation there, or union-wide exchange rate 
appreciation, or both in certain proportions, depending on the monetary policy stance taken by the 
union, but does not cause increase in inflation in slower-growing countries (SGC) by itself, unless the 
union’s monetary authorities take pro-inflationary policy;  2) because of presence of FGC, the SGC 
do not become less competitive in the world, and can benefit from increased export of their goods to 
FGC, provided their labour markets are flexible enough; 3) the real challenge for SGC posed by FGC 
is not inflation, but rather loss of jobs and export revenues, if their labour markets are not flexible 
enough to adjust under tight union-wide monetary policy aimed at keeping the union-wide overall 
price  level  unchanged,  or  the  labour  productivity  increase  in  FGC  is  not  met  by  adequate 
improvement  in  labour  productivity  in  SGC.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  this  ‘adequate 
improvement’ is enough to constitute only a fraction of the productivity growth in FGC.    
               Studies & Analyses CASE No. 257– Uneven Growth in a Monetary Union … 
 
 
  6 
Introduction
1 
The issues raised by the accession to EMU of new, fast growing, members reflect a much 
larger problem: that of uneven growth between regions of similar size within a monetary union. 
One can easily imagine a situation in which one region of EMU (say France and Spain) grows fast, 
while another (say Germany and Italy) of about the same size grows very slowly. What will be the 
effects of such a situation on the slow-growing region?  
Although  there  are  other  factors  influencing  inflation  and  the  external  exchange  rate  in  a 
monetary union, we focus on assessing the role of the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (H-B-S) effect 
in fast-growing countries (FGC) for slow-growing countries (SGC) and the whole union. Having 
introduced a few assumptions to build the mathematical model on, the most important conclusions 
we arrive at are: 
1.  Faster productivity growth in FGC will lead to either inflation there, or union-wide exchange rate 
appreciation,  or  a  mixture  of  both,  depending  on  the  monetary  policy  stance  taken  by  the 
union’s monetary authorities (in the case of the EMU by the ECB). However, it will not cause 
increased in inflation in SGC, unless the union’s monetary authorities take an accommodating 
policy stance.  
2.  The SGC will not become less competitive in the world, and indeed will be able to export more 
of their goods to their faster-growing monetary union partners, provided their labour markets 
are sufficiently flexible. 
3.  The real challenge for SGC posed by FGC is not inflation, but rather loss of jobs, which may 
happen  if  their  labour  markets  are  not  flexible  enough  to  adjust  under  a  tight  union-wide 
monetary policy aimed at keeping the union-wide overall price level unchanged. 
 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  the  starting  point  provides  a  brief  introduction  to  the 
problem. Section 1 presents a mathematical model of the H-B-S effect in one country (not in a 
monetary union), and derives implications for the exchange rate and for inflation in FGC outside a 
monetary union, assuming tight monetary policy stances. Section 2 augments the model with the 
case of two countries in a monetary union with uneven growth rates (faster- and slower-growing), 
and derives the implications of productivity growth in the FGC for the SGC. An outline of policy 
implications following from theoretical discussion is offered in the Concluding remarks.  
                                                            
1 I would like to thank Prof. Jacek Rostowski for extensive comments and guidance in interpreting the modeling in this 
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The starting point: uneven productivity growth and inflation differentials 
If the exchange rate is fixed, the FGC will experience higher inflation than will the SGC. To 
illustrate this, consider the following model
2. There are two countries in a monetary union, A and B, 
producing tradable and non-tradable goods. Tradable goods are easy to export, so their prices 
tend to be equal in both countries. Non-tradable goods, though, have such large trade costs that 
they never enter international trade, hence their prices may vary from country to country. It is 
further assumed that the share of non-tradable goods in total output is a (so that (1-a) is the share 
of tradables), and these shares are equal in the two countries, and the wage level is the same in 
both sectors (although not necessarily the same in both countries).  
 
The inflation rate (π) in A and B  is defined as follows: 
NB TB B
NA TA A
απ π α π





                                                (1) 
where subscripts T and N stand for tradables and non-tradables, respectively. Because of the 
existence of a single currency, inflation rates in tradables are equal across countries. At the same 
time, inflation in each sector should be equal to differences between the growth rates of wages and 























where  x d x log ˆ = is the rate of change in relative terms. We can now derive non-tradable inflation 
as a function of tradable inflation and productivity in both sectors: 
 
NB TB TB NB










By substituting these back to equation (1), we get: 
) ( ) 1 (
) ( ) 1 (
NB TB TB TB B
NA TA TA TA A
q q
q q
− + + − =
− + + − =
π α π α π
π α π α π
 
which implies 
                                                            
2 Taken from De Grauwe (1992).  
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) ( ) ( NB NA TB TA B A q q q q − − − = − α α π π . 
If we assume that there is equal productivity growth in non-tradables in both countries, we obtain 
the following equation: 
) ( TB TA B A q q − = − α π π  
which  implies  that  if  A’s  labour  productivity  in  tradable  sector  grows  faster  than  B’s,  A  will 
experience higher inflation than will B. So, uneven productivity growth implies uneven inflation in a 
monetary union, which is unavoidable, unless the growth is stopped.  
Although this model is a convenient way to start exploring the impact of uneven growth on the 
economy of monetary union, it does not address a number of important issues. In particular, what 
happens to employment and income in the member countries? How the inflation can be managed 
by means of monetary policy? What are the opportunities and challenges for the SGC being in a 
monetary union with FGC? These and some other questions we are to answer by exploring the 
model of H-B-S effect in detail.   
Section 1 
The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson Effect and Its Implications for the 
Case of One Country 
In  this  chapter,  we  explore  the  implications  of  the  H-B-S  effect  for  the  price  level,  output, 
domestic demand and export potential in the case of one country, and also link it with the monetary 
policy stance so as to show its implications for the exchange rate. It will be shown that productivity 
growth in the tradable sector leads to an appreciation of the country’s real exchange rate, but that 
monetary policy can be used to reach a trade-off between nominal exchange rate appreciation and 
inflation. Besides, in no case will a country experiencing productivity growth lose its competitive 
advantage in real terms. It has a wide choice of exchange rate/inflation tradeoffs which do not hurt 
its position on the world market.  
1.1. Assumptions 
Consider a country S with a small open economy that takes the price of imports and exports as 
given on the world market. There are two sectors in the economy: tradables (goods available for 
trade worldwide with reasonable costs of shipping and other trade barriers), and non-tradables 
(goods so costly to trade that they never enter the international trade). The relative unit composite 
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two factors used in production: labour and capital. While S is able to freely import capital from 
abroad at a fixed interest rate r, the domestic supply of labour is limited and equal to Ls=LTS+LNS, 
where subscripts TS and NS stand for the tradable and non-tradable sectors in S, respectively. All 
factor markets in S are perfectly competitive, which implies that wages are equal across the whole 
economy. Some other assumptions also apply: 
1.  Output in both sectors is determined by the Cobb-Douglas production function with two factors, 




NS NS NS S NS
TS TS TS TS
L K A p Y









                                             (1.1.1) 
2. Consumption is regulated by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function: 
 
1 1 1 1
1

























                               (1.1.2) 
subject to the budget constraint:  
 
Zs = CTS + psCNS = wsLs + rQs                                             (1.1.3) 
where ws – equilibrium wage level in S, Qs = domestic capital plus current account balance, CTS, 
CNS stand for consumption of tradables and non-tradables, respectively, 0<γS<1 is the share of  















 – the elasticity of substitution between tradables 
and non-tradables, meaning that with a 1% increase in pS consumption of tradables grows by θS% 
relative to that of non-tradables.  
3.  The nominal exchange rate between S’s currency and other currencies in the world is defined 
by 





                                                        (1.1.4) 
where PTS,Ti  are the nominal prices of tradables in countries S and i. Note that we take into 
account only the prices of tradables, since for the nominal exchange rate (which is formed as a 
result of interaction of supply and demand for currencies required to buy goods on international 
markets) the prices of non-tradables should not matter.  
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4.  The real exchange rate is, according to the theory of purchasing power parity, initially equal to 
one for all the countries, which implies that the same bundle of consumption goods costs the 
same in all countries. 
5.  S experiences productivity growth in its tradable sector, ÂTS=dlogATS>0, and no productivity 
growth in its non-tradable sector. Also, for simplicity, it is assumed that the outer world has zero 
productivity growth. The assumption of no productivity growth in S’s non-tradable sector is not 
crucial to the result, yet very helpful for deriving the algebra. Very similar calculations can be 
performed for the general case of non-zero productivity growth, but with considerably more 
technical difficulty. 
1.2. The model 
We approached the derivation of the H-B-S effect when modelled the impact of uneven growth 
on inflation differentials between two countries. The model we considered there was too simple to 
catch any other effect than the inflation differentials, and now we have to do some more careful 
modelling to show other implications of productivity growth. We start with the case of one country 
to show the basic intuition, and then will proceed to the case of two countries to see the “spill-over” 
effects of productivity growth from one country within a currency union to another. Throughout this 
chapter we use the modelling framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), with some extensions and 
minor alterations.  
Define the output per employed unit of labour as y=Y/L. Then, given a CRS Cobb-Douglas 
production function (eq. (1.1.1)),  
 
TS NS
TS NS TS NS S TS NS k A p y
,
, , , ) (
α ⋅ =  
where k=K/L. By assumption of perfectly competitive factor markets and constant returns to scale,  
 
S TS TS TS TS w rk k A y
TS + = ⋅ =
α
 and S NS NS NS S NS w rk k A p y
NS + = ⋅ =
α
           (1.2.1) 
























which is equivalent to  
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where we made use of the fact that the shares of capital and labour in the total output are equal to 
α and (1-α), respectively. Define 1-α=µ. Then  
 
S TS TS w A ˆ ˆ µ = and  S NS NS S w A p ˆ ˆ ˆ µ = +  




S A A p ˆ ˆ ˆ − =
µ
µ
                                                  (1.2.2) 
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% increase in relative price of non-tradables. 
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) 1 (                     (1.2.3) 
By substituting equations (1.2.3) back into eq. (1.1.2) and scaling it down to unity, we get the 




S S S S p P θ θ γ γ − − − + = 1
1
1 ) 1 (                                             (1.2.4) 

















1 ) 1 (
ˆ ) 1 )( 1 (
1
1 ˆ
                                      (1.2.5) 
Remembering that we have set up ps=1 initially, eq. (1.2.5) simplifies to  
S S S p P ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ γ − =  
This result suggests that the real aggregate price level in S increases by (1-γs)% with each 1% in-




(1-γs)% with each 1% increase in tradable sector productivity.  
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So, we have derived H-B-S effect in its initial formulation: wealthier countries tend to have higher 
price levels. With output growing in S due to increased productivity, its wealth increases, but also 
does its price level. Now comes the implication for the real exchange rate: assuming that there is 
no productivity growth in the reference country i, S’s real exchange rate related to i’s currency ap-
preciates, as S has become a more “expensive” country with an increase in productivity there.  
1.3. Further implications 
Following the theoretical model of the H-B-S effect, we can also derive some implications of 
that in S for its output per worker, total output, income growth, domestic demand and allocation of 
labour in the economy, and finally link the H-B-S effect with inflation and the exchange rate through 
monetary policy. 
Changes in output per-worker. Recall that  S TS TS TS TS w rk k A y
TS + = =
α
 (eq. (1.2.1)). Differentiate 
with respect to kTS to get:  
r k A
TS
TS TS TS =
−1 α α                                                    (1.3.1)  
Then log-differentiate eq. (1.3.1) to get:  
r k A a TS TS TS TS ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ = − + + α  









                                                          (1.3.2) 
Combining eqs. (1.2.1) and (1.3.2), we obtain:  
TS TS k y ˆ ˆ =                                                           (1.3.3) 
which means that with a 1% productivity growth in tradables, per-worker output in this sector grows 
by  TS µ
1









ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ =
+
= =
                                         (1.3.4) 
which is equal to the growth of output per worker in TS, if we apply equation (1.2.2). This result is 
paradoxical, but only at the first sight: since the wage and interest rate are the same in all sectors 
of the economy, labour and capital are employed up to the point where their marginal products are 
equal for all sectors. Actually, this is one of the implications of the H-B-S effect: the relative price of 
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. So,  S TS w y ˆ ˆ = ! This says that the increase in wages is fully compensated by the labour 
productivity increase, then labour still receives its marginal product and the nominal price of trad-
ables (if we were to introduce one at this point) stays unchanged, ceteris paribus. This result goes 
to show that any other country trading with S will not have inflationary pressure from importing TS, 
because its price does not change due to productivity increase. 
Recall the budget constraint (eq. (1.1.3)), Zs = wsLs + rQs. Clearly, with a 1% increase in ws, Zs 




















 with a 1% increase in 




with a 1% increase in ps. With income increasing, demand should also 
increase, but its increase need not necessarily match the output increase, so that we may have a 
change in S’s export potential, which we will not be able to calculate before we explore how do-
mestic demand reacts to the increase in productivity.  
 
Changes in domestic demand. Log-differentiate the optimal demand schedules (1.2.3) to get  
 








,  the  net  increase  in  domestic  demand  for  tradables  is 




















− − − ) 1 )( 1 (
% per each 
1%  increase  in  ATS.  Analogously,  the  net  increase  in  demand  for  non-tradables  is 





− − + −
















− − + − ) 1 )( 1 (
% per each 1% increase in 
ps and ATS, respectively. Note that, reasonably assuming  0 > S θ , consumption of non-tradables 
rises more slowly than that of tradables, which implies that in growing economies the share of non-
tradables in consumption should gradually fall, thus lowering the impact of H-B-S effect on the 
overall price level. 
While overproduced tradables may be exported, non-tradables must be consumed within the 
country. Since per-worker productivity does not necessarily have to grow by the same amount as  
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demand, there is a possibility of reallocation of labour between tradable and non-tradable sectors, 
which is discussed next.  
Reallocation  of  labour.  Recall  that  the  physical  output  of  non-tradables  is  equal  to  
NS NS NS NS L k A Y
NS ⋅ ⋅ =
α
. Log-differentiate this, remembering that ÂNS=0, to get:  
 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS k C k Y L ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ α α − = − =  
since non-tradables do not enter international trade. We already know what ĈNS and  NS k ˆ
are (eqs. 









µ θ γ θ µ ϕ
ˆ









µ θ γ θ µ ϕ
ˆ
) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ˆ ⋅ − − − − + ⋅ − =
.  
We can see from this that – unless S has negative financial wealth so that its share of labour in 
output is above 1 – the higher  S θ , the lower is the growth of employment in the non-tradable 
sector.  Indeed,  if  non-tradables  are  well-substituted  for  by  tradables  ( S θ   approaching  1  from 
below), then there is no need to produce more non-tradables, because the actual demand for them 
will not grow even though income will (if  S θ =1 and φ<1 employment in non-tradable sector should 
actually fall). On the other hand, if non-tradables are not easily substituted for by tradables, there 
will be a higher growth of employment in that sector to meet the growing demand.  
Theoretically, there need not be an increase in unemployment because of labour reallocation: 
production  of  non-tradables  will  exactly  meet  the  demand  for  them,  and  every  extra  unit  of 
tradables produced will be sold on the world market. However, because of structural rigidities and 
imperfect competition on the world market, a country experiencing productivity improvement may 
find it difficult to sell all its extra output of tradables abroad and then unemployment may rise. 
Analysis of this situation is out of this topic, but one can find casual evidence of this in Gordon 
(1998).  
Changes in total output. In this paragraph we continue to assume that labour reallocation does not 
cause  unemployment.  Before  the  productivity  shock,  the  quantity  of  labour  employed  in  the  non-




NS S S S S
w
rQ L w µ γ ) (
, and therefore LS-∆ units of labour were employed in 
tradables. If with a 1% increase in ps there is  NS L ˆ
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p
L y Y ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ν
µ
+ = + =







% per each 1% increase in ps. The growth of total output is a weighted average of 
the growth rates of tradable and non-tradable outputs.
4  
Changes  in  export  potential.  Given  that  consumption  of  tradables  grows  by 












% (eq. (1.3.6)), the net increase 




+ − − +
−
) 1 )( 1 (
1
S S
NS % per 1% increase in ps,. This is very likely to be 
positive, suggesting that a country experiencing productivity growth tends to have its current ac-
count balance improved through exports. The extent to which it can do so depends on the econ-
omy’s structural parameters and consumer preferences. A high share of labour employed in the 
zero-growing non-tradable sector dampens the effect of productivity growth in tradables. A high 
share of labour income in GDP creates higher internal demand for tradables, because it is the 
workers who benefit from the improvement in productivity first. Low substitutability between trad-
ables and non-tradables reduces the effective internal demand for tradables thus increasing export 
potential. On the other hand, if non-tradables are easily substituted by tradables, there is little room 
for a substantial increase in export potential, because much of the increase in output would be 
“eaten up” by domestic consumers. 
Changes in social welfare and consumer behaviour. Social welfare improves with the increase 
in consumption, provided the share of labour income in GDP is high enough, non-tradables are 
substitutable for tradables and there are no significant structural rigidities on the factor markets. 
The role of substitutability should be clear from what was written above. The impact of nominal 
rigidities imposed on the labour market will be discussed in Section 2. Now we want to briefly 
explain why it is important to have an adequately high share of labour income in GDP. Recall that 
                                                            
3 The same sort of calculation can be performed for each 1% increase in ATS using eq. (2.2.2) 
4 However, the growth of total output is much less important to us than the growth of tradable output, because it is trad-
able output that influences the current account, which in its turn, may induce exchange rate realignment to keep the cur-
rent account constant. So, the exchange rate may be influenced by productivity growth not only directly, but also indi-
rectly, through the current account balance. Exploring this link is relevant for my topic, but is left out of the thesis for fur-
ther exploration at later date.  
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− − + −
.  So,  for  a  positive  growth  in  consumption  of 
tradables,  NS S S µ θ γ ϕ ⋅ − − ≥ ) 1 )( 1 ( ;  and  for  a  positive  growth  in  consumption  of  non-tradables, 
[] NS S S S µ θ γ θ ϕ ⋅ − − + ≥ ) 1 )( 1 ( . Therefore, since utility (hence social welfare) is non-decreasing function of 
consumption, it improves only if the share of labour income in GDP, φ, is high enough.  
Furthermore,  along  with  the  obvious  result  that  output  grows  with  improvements  in 
productivity, we get a less obvious result that S is very likely to get richer in terms of purchasing 
power: while its aggregate real price level rises by (1-γS)% with each 1% increase in pS, its income 




 for the same increase in pS, not to mention an increase in its current account 
surplus due to more exports. One implication of this is growing demand for imports, which is a very 
important insight for the next part of the discussion – the case of two countries in a monetary 
union.  
1.4. A monetary policy link 
Notice that all the derivations above do not depend on nominal prices (in other words, they are 
correct for any numeraire), since they were calculated for relative prices. But now we can link the 
H-B-S effect with monetary policy and the nominal exchange rate. Although the H-B-S effect is 
modelled  using  relative  prices,  we  can  introduce  money  in  this  model  if  we  assume  a  certain 
monetary policy stance. Consider two possible different cases of a “neutral” monetary policy: 1) 
when the money stock grows proportionally to the GNP (that is when M/Y=const); 2) when the 
money stock is constant irrespective of output changes.  
The  case  when  M/Y=const.  Recalling  Friedman’s  celebrated  formula,  MV=PY,  M/Y=const 
implies that the aggregate nominal price level, Pn, stays constant unless there are changes in the 
velocity of circulation. Since the relative price of non-tradables rises, in order to guarantee that the 
average price level, Pn, remains constant, its base, that is the nominal price of tradables, should 
fall. But in that case, because of competitive forces, the country’s nominal exchange rate must 
appreciate, thus bringing the price of its tradables back to the international level.  
Formally, the nominal price level is equal to the real price level multiplied by some numeraire η, 




S S S S n p P P θ θ γ γ η η − − − + ⋅ = ⋅ = 1
1
1 ) 1 (                                    (1.4.1) 
Log-differentiating (1.4.1) we get:  
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Then, to keep the above constant, we need  s S p ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ γ η − − = , that is the numeraire should fall by (1-




(1-γs)% with each 1% increase in trad-
able sector productivity.  
Recalling the formula for the nominal exchange rate between countries S and i (eq. (1.1.4)) 
and log-differentiating it, we obtain:  
 
η ε ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , − = − = Ti TS Ti i S P P P  
Since we have assumed that there is no productivity growth in the outer world, PTi should not 
change,  and  then  we  have  the  nominal  exchange  rate  appreciating b y  ( 1 - γs)%  with  each  1% 
increase in ps. Perhaps it is now needless to say that S does not lose its competitiveness because 
its exchange rate appreciation is exactly matched by the fall in its domestic price of tradables.
5 
The case when M=const. Constant money supply implies a reduction in the aggregate price 
level, and the price of tradables falling even more than in the previous case. The exchange rate 
appreciation is greater, but as before, such exchange rate appreciation does not mean any loss of 
competitiveness, because it proceeds to the point where the domestic price of tradables equals 
their international price.  
M=const means  0 ˆ ˆ = +Y Pn , so that the nominal price level should fall by as much as the total 
output would grow as a result of productivity increase (or by as much as the relative price of non-
tradables  increases,  as  one  means  the  other).  The  total  output  growth  associated  with  a  1% 
increase in pS is  
[]ψ ν
µ
γ θ γ θ
µ
ϕ












− − + − ⋅ −
NS




) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (
% 
Then Pn should fall by ψ%, which means that the price of tradables drops by (1-γs+ψ)%, which 
is more than in the previous case. Again, the nominal exchange rate should appreciate by the 
same percentage.  
There  is  also  a  wide  range  of  exchange  rate/inflation  tradeoffs,  in  which  the  money  stock 
grows  faster  than  output,  which  leads  to  less  exchange  rate  appreciation  but  more  inflation. 
Suppose M/Y is not constant, but rather  0 ˆ > = k Pn . Then  s S p k ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ γ η − − = . Since it still holds that 
η ε ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , − = − = Ti TS Ti i S P P P  and we continue to assume that there is no price changes in country i, εS,i 
appreciates by exactly  s S p k ˆ ) 1 ( γ − − . This implies that whatever growth money stock may have, 
the exchange rate is a mirror image of the movements in the numeraire, therefore, there is no loss 
of competitive advantage for the countries experiencing the H-B-S effect, but no gain either.  
                                                            
5 In a more complex setup, though, when we have to deal with non-tradable inputs in tradable goods, there may be some 
loss of competitiveness, but the question then is whether such goods should be classified as fully tradable.  
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Thus, we have seen that productivity growth in S has an impact on income, production and 
consumption, the price level and exchange rate in S, and now aim to explore what “spill-over” 
effects these changes have on S’s monetary union partners.  
Section 2:  
Two Countries in a Monetary Union: What Influence Does the BS 
Effect in One Country Have on the Other? 
2.1. Preliminary observations 
Now that we have studied the implications of the H-B-S effect for one country, we are ready to 
examine its impact on the other countries tied to the FGC by a monetary union and, therefore, by a 
single monetary policy. All the implications for one country which were derived in real terms are still 
valid. However, there are some differences in the effects of monetary policy, and some feedback 
impact from the FGC on their slower-growing monetary union partners. In particular:  
1. The fall in the numeraire required to keep the aggregate price level unchanged is smaller now, 
because the SGC do not experience an increase in their price levels;  
2. The SGC may have its exports (and employment) increase through the increase in demand in 
its  faster-growing  partner,  but  taking  full  advantage  of  this  requires  flexible  labour  market, 
namely the ability to index the wage to the numeraire (i.e. the exchange rate) in order to stay 
competitive; 
3. If labour markets in the SGC are rigid, not only will it be difficult for the SGC to export more, but 
also employment may fall – unless there will be adequate growth in labour productivity;  
4. However, if there is no productivity growth in the SGC and they are unable to make their labour 
market flexible enough, the union’s Central Bank might consider tolerating higher inflation for 
the union as a whole (although this would not increase inflation in the SGC). 
To illustrate this formally, consider a slower-growing country named G forming a monetary 
union with S where productivity grows faster than in G. Let S produce one tradable good, AS, 
which  it  can  export  worldwide  and  sell  at  the  world  market’s  prevailing  price. G  produces  two 
tradable goods: AG (identical to AS) and BG, which S cannot produce. Goods AS, AG and BG are 
also produced and traded worldwide. Both G and S are small countries relative to the size of the 
world market, so the price elasticity of demand for their exports is assumed to be infinite. 
All the assumptions made earlier for S are valid for G, except that G does not experience 
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calculations. All the conclusions are valid even if there is some productivity growth in G (lower than 
in S), although they become less pronounced.  
In addition to the assumptions made in the previous section, we now introduce utility measures 
for the whole G+S union and for both tradable goods (A and B). We continue to use CES utility 
functions. The beauty of the CES utility function is that it allows easy aggregation of the goods 
entering  it,  and  the  price  index  implied  by  it  can  contain  aggregated  prices  of  its  components 
indexed in a similar way as is the final price index. Furthermore, since we calculate the effects in 
percentage points, we are free to choose suitable initial values of relative prices, which greatly 
simplifies calculations and serves for clarity of results.  
Thus, introducing a CES utility function for the G+S union including aggregate goods S and G, 
1 1 1 1 1
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 (where δ=share of G’s economy in the union, and θ is the 
elasticity of substitution in consumption between goods S and G – in fact the propensity to mi-
grate), we derive the G+S aggregate price index in the usual way as 
[] θ θ ρ δ δ − −
+ − + = 1
1
1 ) 1 ( S G P  
where ρ is the relative price of good S in terms of good G. From here we can immediately see that, 
if a 1% increase in pS causes a (1-γs)% increase in PS, then it also causes a (1- δ)(1-γs)% increase 
in PG+S, by analogy with eq. (1.2.5). Thus the presence of a slower-growing country in the union will 
attenuate the exchange rate realignment required to keep the nominal price level constant.  
Another lesson is that the H-B-S effect in S does not have any bearing on inflation in G. As 
was shown previously,  S TS w y ˆ ˆ = , so that the nominal price of tradables stays unchanged. Thus, 
there will be no H-B-S effect-caused price growth in G because of trade with S, no matter how 
much the price index in S appreciates due to the H-B-S effect (as long as there is no autonomous 
H-B-S effect in G itself).  
In this section, implications of growth in the FGC for the SGC  will be derived only for the 
“M/Y=const” case. However, one can use previous intuition and insights from Section 1 to see that 
in the case of fixed money stock, the implications to be derived will be qualitatively the same, 
except that the magnitudes of deflation and exchange rate appreciation will be bigger. 
2.2. The impact of growth in S on output and employment in G: the flexible labour 
market case 
We  assume  that  in  presence  of  the  flexible  labour  market  the  nominal  wage  can  be 
instantaneously  adjusted  so  as  to  render  the  real  wage  equal  to  marginal  product  of  labour. 
However,  we do not assume here that there is full employment. Even if the wage is perfectly 
flexible,  there  may  be  structural  and  frictional  unemployment  caused  by  various  side  factors.  
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Furthermore, there may be a part of population able but not willing to work whose preference 
towards employment may change over time. So, if there is an increase in the labour demand, it 
can, in principle, be met without the real wage going up.  
Recall from previous derivations that a 1% increase in ps results in a 







crease in demand for tradables, including good BG. How does G benefit from the increase in de-
mand for BG in S? If G is a net exporter of good BG and faces constant long-term marginal costs 
MC (because of CRS in the production function), transportation costs for delivery outside the G+S 
union, T, the world market’s price level, WP, and the aggregate downward-sloping intra-union de-
mand curve, DS+G, then the picture looks as follows: see graph below. 
 
G sells BG worldwide at WP (and covers transportation costs), and within the union at MC. The 
volume of exports to the world is unaffected by the increase in demand within the union, so the un-
ion consumes the output of BG that is left. Because of transportation costs, every increase in de-
mand for BG in the union is met by increased production of BG in G, not in the world. Then for 
every 1% increase in ps G gains 







6 in the sector meeting S’s 
demand for BG and a corresponding increase in income.  
2.3. The impact of growth in S on nominal price levels 
As we have seen in sub-section 2.1, 1% increase in pS causes a (1- δ)(1-γs)% increase in PG+S. 
Therefore, in order to keep the overall nominal G+S price index constant, the numeraire in G+S 
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(i.e. the price of its tradable goods) has to go down by the same percentage, which implies a 
corresponding nominal exchange rate appreciation, but no loss of competitiveness for either S or 
G, just as in the case of one country. However, because of differences in growth rates, we now 
have positive dynamics in S’s price level and negative dynamics in G’s. Namely, PS rises by (1-γs)-
(1-δ)(1-γs)=δ(1-γs)% (because it is cushioned by its slower-growing neighbour), but PG goes down 
by (1-δ)(1-γs)%.    
2.4. The impact of growth in S on output and employment in G: the rigid nominal 
wages case 
Nominal wage rigidity can be a real threat for a slow-growing country which is in a monetary 
union with a faster-growing one, especially when the union’s monetary authorities adopt a strong 
anti-inflationary stance. A rigid labour market in G means that while PG goes down, the nominal 
wage  does  not,  thus  leading  to  real  wage  increases  in  G  unmatched  by  productivity  growth. 
Therefore  the  demand  for  labour  will  decline.  Because  of  subsequent  nominal  exchange  rate 
appreciation in the union’s currency, there will also be a drop in G’s exports to the rest of the world 
(as MC in the production of BG in the world’s currency, e.g. USD, shifts upwards) and an increase 
in its imports, as marginal cost in the production of AG increases and that in the production of AS 
remains constant.  
All this will increase G’s unemployment and worsen its current account. True, these negative 
effects will be mitigated by real earnings growth, but the per-capita earnings growth for those in 
employment must, in its turn, be set against the drop in employment. For G to avoid job cuts and a 
decline  in  income  from  exports,  the  central  bank  of  the  G+S  monetary  union  would  have  to 
consider issuing more money than would be enough to satisfy M/Y=const. A good choice would be 
to set  ) 1 )( 1 ( ˆ ˆ
S Y M γ δ − − = −  for each 1% increase in pS, in which case the price level in G would 
stay unchanged, although of course, at the price of somewhat higher inflation in the union as a 
whole.  
We next examine the impact of wage rigidity for employment and output in detail in both the 
short and long run. 
Short-run impact. We use two definitions of the short run: 1) as the period in which capital-to-
labour ratio is fixed at its historical level, and 2) as the period in which the stock of capital is fixed. 
Both  definitions  lead  to  fundamentally  the  same  results.  Namely,  in  the  short  run,  without  an 
adequate  growth  in  labour  productivity,  the  increase  in  the  real  wage  renders  G’s  exports 
uncompetitive on the world market, no matter how labour intensive they may be. In this situation, G 
faces the choice of either withdrawing from the world market or subsidizing the exports of the 
industries that have costs higher than revenues. However, because of the transportation costs 
barrier, domestic production will not stop completely.   
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To see this, consider production of goods AG and BG for export outside the union. In the case 
of fixed K/L ratio, the CRS Cobb-Douglas production function can be transformed as follows:  
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                                                    (2.4.2) 
Log-differentiate (2.4.2) to get: 
w MC d ˆ ) 1 ( ) log( α − =                                             (2.4.3) 
which implies that, under given technology the only way to prevent average costs from growing 
(i.e. to break even with exports) is to avoid wage increases in the absence of adequate labour 
productivity growth. If the wage grows unmatched by productivity, exports become uncompetitive 
and the workers lose their jobs.  
If there were some productivity growth, eq. (2.4.3) would look differently: 
 
A w MC d ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ) log( − − = α  
So, it would be possible to offset the increase in costs due to real wage increases by sufficient in-
creases in labour productivity. Notice here that for a given productivity growth in S’s tradable sector 
it takes much lower (but non-zero!) productivity growth in G’s tradable sector to restore G’s com-






% (eq. (1.2.2)), then the wage in 








(1- δ)(1-γs)(1-α)% increase in A in the produc-
tion function, which is much less than the 1% improvement in productivity in TS. Therefore, G can 
cope with the impact of productivity growth in S, if it ensures that its workers receive exactly their 
marginal product.  
When capital stock is fixed, we come to fundamentally the same results, with the difference 
that it is now possible to trim marginal costs down to the WP-C level by decreasing the output of 
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unmatched with productivity growth, it is impossible to restore average costs, so that the export 
industry will be making negative profits. 
Consider the output per unit of capital,  
 
α α − − = = =
1 1 ) / ( / Al K L A K Y y                                             (2.4.4) 
where l=L/K.  
 
Derive l  from eq. (2.4.4) and substitute the result back to the total cost function per unit of capital: 
α − + = + = = 1
1
) / ( / A y w r r wl K C c  
Derive the marginal cost function and log-differentiate it (holding A and r are fixed): 

























We see that it is now possible to manipulate output in order to keep marginal costs unchanged. To 









i.e. with every 1% increase in wage, output must contract by  α
α − 1
%, which, given our production 
function, is equivalent to α
1
% drop in employment (consider that  L K L l ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ = − = ).  
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−                                   (2.4.5)  
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So, it is not possible to adjust the average costs to their previous level, unless there is an 
adequate growth in labour productivity. If there is none, then the exporting industries will make 
losses and, if not subsidised, will have to withdraw from the market. However, if we assume that 
capital, once allocated to production in a particular sector cannot be reallocated to another (so that 
it effectively becomes a bye-gone cost), then exports of BG will not collapse immediately. What will 
collapse is returns to the owners of capital used in the production of BG, who will effectively suffer 
a capital loss. Such a situation will lead to a slow decline in BG production, as capital used in the 
sector declines through depreciation which is not replaced. 
For intra-union exports of AG the situation is similar: since S is now the most efficient producer 
of A, the intra-union trade of A will decline, until it ultimately becomes negligible. However, with 
intra-union sales of BG the situation is different: because of the protection offered to G’s producers 
by transportation costs of B from the rest of the world, it is cheaper for  S to buy BG than its 
analogue on the world market. This implies that there exists a finite price elasticity of exports on 
the intra-union market, -σ% per each 1% increase in price. Thus the producers of BG meeting the 
demand  from  S  do  not  have  to  shut  down  or  ask  for  subsidies.  Nevertheless,  they  will  also 
experience a decrease in output and employment. 
With each 1% increase in pS marginal costs of good BG increase by  ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( α δ γ ′ − − − S % 
(where (1-ά) = the share of labour in the production of BG). The increase in the price of good BG 
relative to the price of AS (not of AG because there is no point in buying A at a dearer price from G 
than it can be obtained domestically in S) is also  ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( α δ γ ′ − − − S %. Assuming a CES demand 
function  for  goods  A  and  B  in  both  countries,  the  demand  for  B  from  S  falls  by 
[] )% 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( α δ γ ω β ω ′ − − − − − + S , where ω is the elasticity of substitution in consumption 
between A and BG and β is the share of BG in total consumption of tradables by S. However, with 
income in S rising, the net increase in demand for BG is  
 
[] )% 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( α δ γ ω β ω θ γ
µ
ϕ
λ ′ − − − − − + − − − − = S S S
LNS  
per 1% increase in ps, the sign of which is ambiguous. One insight of the expression above is that 
if good BG is capital intensive then nominal wage rigidity in G does not have too great an impact 
on demand for BG in S, but that otherwise G is likely to lose sales even in friendly S. Recalling eq. 
(2.4.4) for BG, we obtain the net increase in employment in sector BG, λ/(1-ά)%, while in sector AG 
there is clearly negative employment growth. So, the only hope for G’s exports to S to recover is 
for higher exports of BG, which is not produced in S and which it is cheaper for S’s consumers to 
buy from G than to import from the world market (up to the point at which the increase in the price 
of GB corresponds to the transportation cost of bringing B from the world market).  
With employment and output in export sectors decreasing in G, the trend in domestic sales is 
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will lead to higher unemployment, which will further reduce consumption. True, the increase in per-
capita labour income may stimulate demand and thus reduce the layoffs, but it will not completely 
offset  the  divestment  of  labour,  because  of  the  substitution  effect  between  labour  and  capital. 
Therefore,  although  the  situation  with  output  is  unclear,  in  the  end  we  observe  a  decrease  in 
employment in the sum of the tradable and non-tradable sectors, except as regards BG, where the 
situation with employment is uncertain.  
Long-run impact. In the long run, capital use can be adjusted to its most efficient level. With 
wages  remaining  rigid,  and  in  the  absence  of  labour  productivity  growth,  G  will  lose  its 
competitiveness on the world market, because there will be no way to adjust its marginal costs 
back to the world market’s price. Changing the technology parameter, “alpha”, will not reduce costs 
either. Since it is hardly possible that the government will subsidise G’s industry in the long run, 
inability to adjust marginal costs down will result in withdrawal of G’s goods from the world market. 
Of course, this is in case of infinite price elasticity of exports. In another framework (e.g., Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977), where countries are assumed to have some pricing power on the world market, 
higher costs would mean a reduction of exports, not their complete cessation. On the intra-union 
market, the situation will be the same as described for the short run.  
To see why marginal costs cannot be adjusted downwards with real wage increases and zero 
productivity  growth,  consider  the  cost  minimization  problem  with  a  Cobb-Douglas  production 
function with CRS: 
Y L AK t s rK wL = +
−α α 1 . . , min  







































































                                             (2.4.7) 
Marginal costs, in this case equal to average costs, are now constant regardless of the volume of 
output, so that we cannot simply reduce them by reducing output. Changing the “alpha” does not 
solve the problem, either. To see this, log-differentiate eq. (2.4.7) holding A and r fixed to get: 
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Again, as in the short-run case, if there were adequate labour productivity growth, the marginal 
costs would not increase, so that G would remain competitive in the world market. This can be 
seen immediately from eq. (2.4.7).  
Other implications. The wage rigidity in G has further repercussions for its economy, especially 
for income and employment. Acquiring extra capital will  worsen  G’s current account. Domestic 
demand in G will be damaged by unemployment: although there will be an increase in real wages, 
some labour will be divested thus lowering aggregate demand. Some second-order effects (e.g., 
demand switching from AG to cheaper AS, labour migration from G to S, market segmentation) 
could also be modelled.  
But it does not take an advanced modelling exercise to make the important point here: in slow-
growing parts of a monetary union, wage rigidities seriously damage the economy by reducing 
employment and income, and depriving citizens of a great deal of the potential benefits that their 
faster-growing partner countries could bring. Therefore governments in SGC should not focus on 
trying to delay the accession of new, faster-growing members, or on hindering growth accelerating 
reforms in their current partners, but rather on institutional reforms to enhance the flexibility of their 
own markets.  
An alternative solution to the dilemma of the SGC with inflexible labour markets, is for the 
currency union’s central bank to allow slightly higher inflation in the union. However, this would not 
be for the sake of faster-growing S (it is doing fine at whatever union-wide inflation rate), but to 
help G’s workers keep their jobs, in spite of their nominal wage rigidity and the ensuing mismatch 
between real  wages and productivity  in  G. Such an increase in the union’s inflation, however, 
would not have to be met by increases in the interest rate, as long as price increases in non-
tradables in S are caused by productivity (and therefore production) growth in S’s tradables sector.   
Concluding Remarks 
The results obtained above suggest the following: 
1.  For  a  monetary  union,  having  countries  that  grow  at  a  faster-than-average  rate  does  not 
increase union-wide inflation, if a neutral monetary policy stance (M/Y=const) is adopted by 
the central bank. However, this comes at the expense of higher inflation in faster-growing 
countries and lower inflation (or even deflation) in slower-growing countries of the union. 
2.  Under the neutral monetary policy described above, and provided that SGCs have flexible 
enough  labour  markets  (so  that  they  can  adjust  their  nominal  wages  in  line  with  actual 
inflation  or  deflation),  SGCs  clearly  benefit  from  increased  demand  for  their  exports  from 
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suffer a fall in output and employment. Even though there will still be an increase in demand 
from  faster-growing  countries,  it’s  effects  on  output  and  employment  in  SGCs  may  be 
significantly limited by increased real production costs. For the same reason SGCs, with rigid 
labour markets and fast growing co-members of a monetary union implementing a neutral 
policy stance, will find it increasingly hard to compete on the international markets with more 
efficient  producers  –  unless  they  generate  adequate  productivity  growth.  However,  the 
amount of productivity growth that needs to be generated for SGCs to avoid suffering as a 
result of fast growth among their union partners is a small fraction of the growth that the FGCs 
achieve. 
3.  Therefore,  the  real  problem  SGCs  face  in  admitting  new,  faster-growing  countries  to  a 
monetary union they belong to, or seeing current members growing faster, is not that this will 
increase union-wide inflation (let alone the SGC domestic inflation), given a neutral monetary 
policy, but rather that their rigid labour markets will render them less competitive both union-
wide and internationally. Generally, the more labour-intensive their exports are and the more 
oriented they are to world trade outside the monetary union, the more will their losses in 
employment and output be.  
4.  The overall gain or loss for SGCs from the monetary union’s expansion depends on many 
factors,  such  as  technology  parameters  (labour  intensity),  shares  of  tradables  and  non-
tradables in consumption, the share of exports going to countries within the union, nominal 
rigidities in labour markets, etc. However, the union’s central bank may want to protect slow-
growing members from losses by setting its monetary policy so that their aggregate price level 
is  unchanged  (most  importantly,  does  not  decline).  In  this  case  there  will  be  no  nominal 
appreciation of the union’s currency, no losses due to labour market rigidities, but higher than 
zero  union-wide  inflation.  However,  it  is  important  to  understan d  t h a t  t h i s  m e a s u r e  i s  
undertaken to protect slower-growing countries, while faster-growing ones would do just as 
well under a zero inflation target.  
There are also a few policy implications following from the theoretical discussion above. First, 
in a monetary union in which members experience unequal productivity growth rates and have rigid 
labour markets, the monetary authorities are faced with three choices (and their combinations, 
wherever possible): 1) low or zero union-wide inflation, with output contraction and unemployment 
in slower-growing countries; 2) higher inflation in faster-growing countries, low or zero inflation in 
slower-growing  countries,  and  moderate  inflation  union-wide,  with  no  losses  of  income  or 
employment in SGCs; 3) zero union-wide inflation and labour market reforms in slower-growing 
countries.  
The final choice depends on the decision-making process and on how successfully individual 
countries lobby their positions with the monetary authority, which is supranational by default. Thus, 
the  first  choice  seems  to  be  the  best  for  the  union’s  Central  Bank,  as  it  pursues  union-wide 
objectives, such as the aggregate inflation level. The third choice is also good for the CB, but  
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individual countries might find it difficult to implement labour market reforms. The second choice is 
the best for the SGCs, which do not have to undertake any reform in this case, but the CB might 
well  argue  against  it  and  FGCs  might  loose  slightly  from  the  slightly  higher  inflation  they 
experience.  
In the end we would like to stress that in no case should higher-than-average productivity 
growth be an obstacle for any country trying to join a monetary union. High growth in some union 
members is an economic blessing that can be shared among all the union’s participants, if they are 
flexible enough to benefit from it, and not a curse that should be avoided. With long-established 
economic ties and political integration accelerating recently, fast and smooth accession of the new 
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